Isaac N. Green

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Education

- **Cornell University** Ithaca, NY
  Ph.D. in Finance, SC Johnson Graduate School of Management Expected May 2022
  Graduate Committee: Matthew Baron (chair), Justin Murfin, Murillo Campello, Mani Sethuraman
- **Oberlin College** Oberlin, OH
  B.A. in Economics (High Honors) 2009-2013

Working Papers

- **"Does Fintech Lending Amplify the Transmission of Monetary Policy?" (Job Market Paper)**
  - Abstract: I find that fintech (onlined-based non-bank) lenders in residential mortgage markets amplify the transmission of monetary policy. In a difference-in-differences setting, I show that when mortgage rates fall, mortgage refinance activity is stronger in counties with higher fintech lender presence (as measured by either the number of active fintech lenders or their local market shares). Local retail expenditures and small business investment also increase in high-fintech jurisdictions. To address endogeneity concerns, I exploit the strictness of state-level regulations for certifying new non-bank mortgage lenders, which I show affects the rate of fintech entry into various states. Using these state-level differences, I compare adjacent counties on opposite sides of state borders with differential numbers of licensed fintech lenders, and show that there is a discontinuous positive jump in refinancing activity in states with greater numbers of fintech firms. Finally, I find evidence that fintech monetary transmission is related to its ability to overcome credit frictions in underserved areas: when rates fall, the refinance and consumption growth effects of fintech lending are strongest in counties with large racial/ethnic minority communities, low population density, and few physical bank branches.
- **"The Aftermath of Credit Booms: Evidence from Credit Ceiling Removals" (with Matthew Baron)**
  - Abstract: In the years after WWII, many countries adopted "credit ceilings" – annual restrictions on the quantity of aggregate credit banks could extend – as a means of monetary control. We identify a group of 13 countries that enacted and subsequently removed credit ceilings and study the aftermath of these deregulatory events, with an eye towards understanding the formation of credit booms and the events that follow them. We find that a removal of credit ceilings predicts sharp, sudden increases in credit-to-GDP ratios, which, almost universally, are followed by increases in investment, real estate construction, and asset prices over the short-term, and then by reversals and banking crises in the medium-run. These credit booms are driven by the types of banks and loans most affected by deregulation, and the timing is most consistent with credit ceiling removals relative to other types of financial deregulations that happened in the same era. We uncover several new phenomena related by credit booms: the asynchronous nature of GDP and credit growth and "calm before the storm" phenomenon described in theory by Greenwood, Hanson, and Jin (2019); "successive bubbles," as asset price booms inflate and reverse in succession; and the "irreversibility" of credit booms: once started, they are resistant to regulatory efforts to reimpose control. Our results have implications today for macroprudential policy and for credit control policies in countries such as China.

Works in Progress

- **"Elections Have Consequences: Presidential Battleground States and the Geography of Corporate Investment" (with Ekaterina Potemkina)**
  - Abstract: Using a regression discontinuity framework combined with a borders-based identification approach, we examine whether federal grant and procurement spending are directed toward closely-contested presidential "battleground" states, and whether these spending patterns have real effects on the location of corporate activity. Using a dataset of government procurement and grant contracts from 2000-2020, a period that covers six presidential election cycles, we find that counties in located in battleground states receive more federal funds in the years that follow a closely-contested election. We test whether this effect leads firms in government-dependent industries to locate operations in states thought to be crucial in presidential elections.

Teaching

- Managerial Finance — Fall 2019
  - Introductory finance course for undergraduate and non-MBA Master's Students.
  - Total enrollment of 55 students.

Teaching Assistance

- Behavioral Finance (MBA); with Professor Matthew Baron — 2018, 2019
- Investments & Portfolio Management (MBA); with Professor Matthew Baron — 2018, 2019
- Managerial Finance (AMBA); with Professor Gideon Saar — 2018
- Financial Markets and Institutions (MBA); with Professor Maureen O'Hara — 2017, 2018
- Managerial Finance (MBA); with Professor Gideon Saar — 2017

Research Experience

- Joint research with Professor Matthew Baron — 2019-Present
- Research assistant to Professor Sumudu Wagugala — Spring 2020
- Research assistant to Professor Yifei Mao — Spring 2019
- Research assistant to Professor Matthew Baron — Fall 2017, Fall 2018
- Research assistant to Professor Margarita Tsoutsoura — Spring 2018

Awards

- Bartholomew Family Ph.D. Fellowship — 2019
- Phi Beta Kapp Inductee, Oberlin College — 2013
- Comfort Starr Award for Undergraduate Economics — 2013

Other Employment

- *Research Assistant*, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington D.C. — 2013-2016

Academic References

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